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H.: Spontaneous Exclamations v. Res Gestae
EDITOBIAL NOTES

suffered by the lessee if apportionment were required on the basis
of the production of each parcel of the premises no such apportionment should be allowed without the consent of the lessee, for
the simple reason he should not be compelled to perform substantially more than he has contracted to perform.
As to the matter of development it is clear the lessee can be compelled to develop the premises leased with reasonable diligence and
his duty in this respect cannot be changed without his consent. It
was suggested in the previous note that in Campbell v. Lynch the
plaintiff's tract of land was so large that he possibly would not be
without remedy against the lessee if there was failure to develop
his portion. The lessee was bound to develop the whole tract
reasonably and if he developed five tracts and did not drill any
wells on the sixth tract (which contained over eighty acres) certainly the owner of such tract should have relief in equity because
this would be a breach of the implied covenant to develop the entire tract diligently. Courts which have established an exception
to the settled rule of law that a court of equity will not enter a
decree in aid of a forfeiture would not be likely to deny relief in
such a case at suit of the assignee of a portion of the leased premises because of an old and technical rule of law as to the enforcement of rights of entry for condition broken.
-- J. W. S.
SPONTANEOUS EXCLAMATIONS v. RES GEsTtE.-Perhaps no phrase
in the whole field of evidence is the subject of so much misuse as
the mystic shibboleth "res gestae." For many years the phrase
has been quite generally used as a convenient "catch-all" to cover,
for purposes of admissibility, many hearsay statements which the
courts, by a sort of judicial intuition, have felt should be admitted, but, at the same time, have failed to assign as a reason for
their admission any more satisfactory explanation than the timeworn, empty assertion that they are "a part of the res gestae."
The phrase seems to be a relic of the days (not long since) when
there was a general belief in so-called solving words and juristic
conceptions-a belief, which, as a matter of legal history, generally
obtains in the early periods of legal growth. In the development
of the law, however, changes in conditions require changes in legal
rules and conceptions, and, hence the modern tendency to break
'See James Bradley Thayer, 15 Am. L. Rviv. 1, 5 et seq.
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away from the early belief in the all sufficiency of mere solvhig
words and juristic conceptions. 2 In view of this fact, then, is there
any justification for the modern reluctance of the judiciary to
break away from its early belief in the solving power of the mystic
words res gestae?
A recent case before the Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia admirably illustrates the problem. In that case, Starcher v.
South Penn Oil Co.,' A, upon hearing a loud report as if from an
explosion, approached the locality from which the report came,
and found B lying unconscious near a severed, high-pressure, gas
pipe line. After an unascertained length of time B regained consciousness, and A asked him what hurt him; whereupon B, pointing to the broken pipe line, said, "That hurt me, it struck me
in the back." B died immediately afterwards. In an action for
personal injury caused by negligently maintaining an unsafe, highpressure'pipe line it appeared that B was on the premises by the
invitation of the defendant. Held, that the hearsay statement was
admissible "as a part of the res gestae."
The principal case is all the more interesting because of the fact
that in another rather recent case, substantially on all fours with
the principal case, the Supreme Court of Louisiana reached a directly opposite conclusion. 4 In fact precedents in point are in
such hopeless conflict and confusion that an eminent Chief Justice not long since remarked that "there are few problems in the
law of evidence more unsolved than what things are to be embraced in those occurrences that are designated in the law as res
gestae."5 If, then, what we may call the solving words, res gestae,
do not solve, at any rate do not solve with sufficient certainty and
adaptability to varying circumstances it would seem that the courts
would here, as elsewhere, be justified in breaking away from their
early belief in the all sufficiency of mere words and conceptions.
But first, what is meant or supposed to be meant by the mystic
words res gestae? It is generally said that hearsay statements are
admissible as "a part of the res gesta" or "res gestae" [i. e., as an
exception to the hearsay rule], provided (1) that there is some
[non-verbal] act (res gestd) that is itself admissible under the issue, (2) that the hearsay statements characterize or explain the
2See Pound, Foreword to EwART, WAIVEa DISTRIBUTED.
'95 S. E. 28 (w. Va. 1918).
4Bionto v. Illinois Cent. R. Co., 125 La. 147, 51 So. 98 (1910).
5
mr. Chief Justice Beasley in Hunter v. State, "40 N. J. L. 495, 536 (1878).
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act and (3) that the statements and the act accompany each other,
i. e., are contemporaneous.6 But when is a statement so contemporaneous with an admissible act that it is a part of the act and,
therefore, admissible as a part of the so-called res gestae? In the
principal case the act (res gesta) was the accident and the statement was made not at the time of the accident but after the lapse
of an unascertained period of time, including an unascertained
period of unconsciousness. Now, in the very nature of things-in
logic, law or what-not-it would seem to be impossible for a
statement to be actually a part of a wholly-past, complete and
severable act, here the accident)' It seems clear, therefore, that the
statement in the principal case cannot possibly be a part of the
accident or act, and, hence, unless there is some other ground than
the alleged "res gestae" reason the statement is excluded by the
hearsay rule.
May the evidence, then, be admitted on any other ground? In
dealing with this general problem Mr. Wigmore in his great work
on Evidence ably advocates the total abolition of the use of the
empty phrase res gestae and the substitution of a rational principle of law-a principle which the learned author calls the doctrine of "Spontaneous Exclamations." Nor is Mir. Wigmore's doctrine without judicial sanction. In fact it has been rather recently
expressly adopted by the New York Court of Appeals8 in a strong
opinion in which the res gestae doctrine was thrust aside and the
doctrine of spontaneous exclamations was expressly sanctioned and
followed. Perhaps the latter doctrine may be best explained in
the apt language of its author :9
"This general principle is based on the experience that,
under certain external circumstances of physical shock, a
stress of nervous excitement may be produced which stills the
reflective faculties and removes their control, so that the utterance which then occurs is a spontaneous and sincere response to the actual sensations and perceptions already produced by the external shock. Since this utterance is made
under the immediate and uncontrolled domination of the
GSee Sample v. Consolidated, etc. Co., 50 W. Va. 472, 478, 40 S. E. 597 (1901).
See 3 \WxGmoRE, EVIDENCE, §§ 1753, 1754, 1756.
7People v'. Del Vermo, 192 N. Y. 470, 85 N. E. 690 (1908).
SPeople v. Del Vermo, supra. See also Lander v. People, 104 Ill. 248, 256 (1882);
Mitchum v. State, 11 Ga. 615 (1852).
In fact the principal case, while purporting
to follow the res gestae doctrine, also quotes and purports to follow the passage from
Wigmore which lays down the doctrine of dpontaneous exclamations.
OWIoGIoRE, op. cit., § 1747.
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senses, and during the brief period when considerations of
self-interest could not have been brought fully to bear by
reasoned reflection, the utterance may be taken as particularly
trustworthy (or, at least, as lacking the usual grounds of
untrustworthiness), and thus as expressing the real tenor of
the speaker's belief as to the facts just observed by him; and
may therefore be received as testimony to those facts."
Applying this principle to the facts of the principal case it
seems quite clear that (with a possible qualification to be mentioned hereafter) the hearsay statement in question was made by
the decedent under the immediate influence of the "external shock"
while his reflective faculties were stilled and before he had time
to contrive a false statement. Hence, the evidence, though not a
part of the res gestae, is a spontaneous utterance and admissible
under the doctrine of spontaneous exclamations. The possible
qualification to this conclusion is that it does not appear whether
the deceased declarant was unconscious during the whole of the
unascertained period of time which elapsed between the time of
injury and the time when he was found, and if the declarant remained conscious for a considerable time before he became unconscious, during which period of consciousness his reflective faculties were not stilled by the shock so that he had time to reflect and
contrive a false statement, the mere fact that he subsequently became unconscious would not render the statement made by him
immediately upon regaining consciousness a spontaneous exclamation. In order, then, to admit the statement as a spontaneous
exclamation it would seem that it should be made to appear to the
satisfaction of the court that the period of time between the happening of the exciting cause and the making of the statement was
such that, taking into consideration a possible or probable intermediate period of consciousness, the total period would "presumably preclude fabrication." Apparently, however, the period
of time between the happening of the "exciting cause" and the
discovery of the injured declarant was so brief that even if substantially the whole period was a period of consciousness the statement was still made under the immediate influence of the exciting
cause and, hence, was admissible as a spontaneous exclamation.
One of the several objections to the res gestae doctrine is that
under that doctrine the hearsay statement is not admissible unless
the act which it accompanies and characterizes is also admissible
under the issue. It is quite clear, however, that this limitation is
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not founded upon sound principle. 0
Thus, suppose that the
principal case had been a proceeding to probate an alleged will of
the deceased and the issue had been whether the will was a forgery, and the evidence offered was that immediately upon regaining
consciousness the declarant exclaimed: "Great Heavens! I wish I
had made a will." The death being admitted, the act (accident)
being irrelevant would not be admissible. Hence, if we adhere to
the res gestae doctrine the statement is inadmissible, but it is quite
clear that there is no distinction, upon principle, between the supposititious case and the principal case and that the statement
should be admitted, but in order to admit it in the supposititious
case the res gestae doctrine must be abandoned and the spontaneous
exclamation doctrine adopted.
Another objection to the res gestae doctrine (the only other
which space permits taking up) is that the doctrine, strictly applied, excludes all statements made after the act has occurred, for
otherwise the statement cannot be said to be "a part of the act,"
i.e., "a part of the res gestae." Thus, as was stated by Bartlett,
J., in People v. Del Vermo," speaking of a case'12 in which such
"after-made" statements were admitted as a part of the res
gestae:
"Strictly speaking the spontaneous declaration there under
consideration did not really form part of the res gestae.......
for the exclamation was uttered after the act .... had been
wholly completed ..... although it is true that the time which
had elapsed was very short. The decision, therefore, is clearly
an authiority for the admissibility of proof of such exclamations relative to an injury provided they are of the character
and made under the conditions which have already been
stated [viz., provided they are spontaneous exclamations], although they are subsequent in point of time to the infliction
of the injury."
Similarly in the case in which the above-mentioned statement occurred, an extra-judicial statement of an injured person made immediately after he was injured was admitted below "as a part of
the res gestac"; but Bartlett, J., in the Court of Appeals said:

"The statement . .

.

.was admitted as a part of the res

IOSee 3 WIxMORn, op. cit., § 1753.
nSupra.
=Commonwealth v. Haekett, 2 Allen 136 (Mass. 1861).
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gestae in the broadest sense of the term. I think that it must
be deemed to have been properly received under the exception
to the general rule excluding hearsay evidence, which is
treated by Professor Wigmore under the convenient term of
' spontaneous exclamations.' (3 WiGmoRE ON EVIDENCE, §1745).
That exception may be stated as follows .... It will be observed that this exception contemplates and permits proof of
declarations by an injured person made after the event, so
that it cannot fairly be said that the words spoken really constitute a part of the thing done."
So in the principal case the statement in question, having been
made not at the time of the act but after a lapse of an unascertained length of time, cannot be admitted as a part of the act, i. e.,
as a part of the res gestae, though, subject to the above-mentioned
qualification, it is admissible as a spontaneous exclamation. The
case, then, when considered with the afore-mentioned Louisiana case
to the contrary and the many other confused cases pro and con,13
would seem to justify the following vigorous language by the foremost authority on the subject of evidence:14
"The phrase res gestae is, in the present state of the law,
not only entirely useless, but even positively harmful. It is
useless, because every rule of evidence to which it has ever
been applied exists as a part of some other well-established
principle and can be explained in the terms of that principle.
It is harmful, because by its ambiguity it invites the confusion of one rule with another and thus creates uncertainty
as to the limitations of both. It ought therefore wholly to be
repudiated, as a vicious element in our legal phraseology. It
should never be mentioned. No rule of evidence can be created
or applied by the mere muttering of a shibboleth. There are
words enough to describe the rules of evidence. Even if there
were no accepted name for one or another doctrine, any name
would be preferable to an empty phrase so encouraging to
looseness of thinking and uncertainty of decision.""'
-T. P. H.
13See a discussion of some of the cases in Sample v. Consolidated, etc. Co., supra.
See, also, 3 wiGMORE, op. Cit., § § 1745 et seq.
13 WIoMORE, oP. cit., § 1795.
25Many extra-judicial statements which are not spontaneous exclamations are generally admitted on the ground that they ,are "a part of the res gestae," but, as Mr.
Wigmore points out, they are "utterances to which the [hearsay] rule is in its
nature not applicable."
As to this class of utterances see 3 WIGmORE, op. cit.,
§§ 1745, 1768-1797.
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